Your browser has JavaScript disabled. Marianne Talbot Student Essay Competition
The Philosophical Society (PhilSoc) instituted the Marianne Talbot Essay
Competition in the Hilary term 2012. Marianne Talbot, our President Emerita
and renowned author, is a retired Director of Studies in Philosophy at the
Oxford University Department for Continuing Education. The Competition's
objective is to promote a serious interest in philosophy by encouraging and
stimulating students who participate in Oxford University's Department for
Continuing Education (OUDCE) philosophy on-line courses and weekly attended
classes.
Entry for the Competition is very simple, since all a student needs to do is
submit an essay of maximum length 1,500 words already written as part of
required coursework. The full rules governing the termly essay prize and
submission are found HERE .
Each term, all prize-winners (1st, 2nd and 3rd prize) will receive diplomas
and prizes of Amazon vouchers (£50, £30 and £20). They will also be awarded
one year's free membership of Philsoc, and their essays will be published
here on the Philsoc website. The essay winning 1st prize will also appear in
Philsoc's prestigious Annual Review, a copy of which is one of the benefits
of Philsoc membership. All prize-winners will receive private comments on
their essays from the judges.
OUDCE holds many qualifying philosophy courses in a term. To win a place in
the Competition is quite an achievement! The essays will be judged by
philosophically well-qualified members of The Philosophical Society who do
not know the identity of the authors, only the titles of the courses they
are pursuing.
Submission deadlines
Michaelmas 2024 Term competition winners:
1st Rena MacLeod (Australia)
Confronting Theism: Reconciling the Problem of Evil and Unattributable
Suffering
2nd Roland Rosmond (Sweden)
Exploring the Existence of God: Philosophical Arguments and
Counterpoints
3nd Frank Roetker (USA)
Epistemology of Testimony: Reductionist vs Non-reductionist Positions
Judges' Guidelines
Click HERE to see the
important Judges' Guidelines . They explain both what we are looking
for and what we are hoping not to see in the essays we mark.
Previous Prize winners
Trinity 2024
1st Prize Tim Beech (UK)
Can Plato’s argument against democracy be answered?
2nd Prize David Molyneux (UK)
Describe and explain why Gettier-style cases demonstrate that the
tripartite account of knowledge is unsustainable.
3rd Prize Camilla Giannoni (UK)
Do you think there are genuine moral dilemmas? Why?
Hilary 2024
1st Prize Damian K F Pang (Hong Kong)
Is Epistemological Reductionism Defensible?
2nd Prize Philippa Stewart (Australia)
Do you think that there are genuine moral dilemmas? Why?
3rd Prize Neil Williams (Hong Kong)
Give reasons in support of relativism. Why would we prefer a
relativistic notion of truth?
Michaelmas 2023
1st Prize Akanksha Kevalramani (UAE)
For the sake of argument, assume that determinism is true. Are you
morally responsible for at least some of your actions?
2nd Prize Ana Selimbegović (Germany)
Are there genuine moral dilemmas?
3rd Prize (none awarded)
Trinity 2023
1st Prize Massimo Passamonti (Monaco)
From Schopenhauer to Turing: a novel approach to compatibilism
2nd Prize (none awarded)
3rd Prize (none awarded)
Hilary 2023
1st Prize Gabriella Sciarrone (UK)
Non-cognitivists believe that when we act morally, we must act to
satisfy a desire of our own. Can such an action be truly moral?
2nd Prize Carolyn Buss (UK)
Strawson doubts that the question of whether determinism is true is a
significant one for morality. What are his reasons, and is he right?
3rd Prize Graham Cooper (UK)
Quasi-realism rescues moral truth.
Michealmas 2022
1st Prize Enrique Benjamin R. Fernando III (Philippines)
Is structural realism the best of both worlds?
2nd Prize Jonathan Coull (Canada)
Mathematically Equivalent Formulations and Structural Realism
Joint 3rd Prize Piet Van Assche (Belgium)
What is the difference between science and pseudoscience?
Joint 3rd Prize Linda Hattersley (UK)
The Oxford Riots Legal Case
Trinity 2022
1st Prize Simon Drew (UK)
Assess any - one or more
- of the criticisms of Kant's moral philosophy made by Schiller,
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hegel or Marx
2nd Prize Sam Livy (UK)
Discuss critically Kant's
arguments for his claims that the good will has unconditional value and that
only actions motivated by duty have moral worth
3rd Prize Dessislava Fessenko (Bulgaria)
Describe and explain why
Gettier-style cases demonstrate that the tripartite account of knowledge
(the “TAK”) is unsustainable. How should one go about offering a theory
of knowledge that is immune to Gettier-style cases, do you think? Can
one offer a theory of knowledge that is immune to Gettier-style
cases?
Hilary 2022
1st Prize Paul Dixon (UK)
Are beliefs ‘in the head’?
Joint 2nd Prize Graham Cooper (UK)
Constructive empiricism – a pragmatic alternative to realism and
positivism.
Joint 2nd Prize Stefanie Tadros (UK)
How far is climate change a matter of international justice?
Michaelmas 2021
1st Prize David Molyneux (UK)
Why is the causal exclusion argument a problem for anomalous monism?
2nd Prize Peter Tiffin (UK)
What are Rawls’ principles of justice? Is his argument for them convincing?
3rd Prize Evgenia O’Connor (UK)
Are there non-existent things?
Trinity 2021
1st Prize Michael Schwabe (Australia)
Strawson doubts that the question whether determinism is true is a
significant one for morality. What are his reasons, and is he right?
2nd Prize Emily Linnane (UK)
Does Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes offer the
best of Popper’s and Kuhn’s philosophies of science without their
weaknesses, or does it combine the weaknesses of both?
Joint 3rd Prize Dominic Windram (UK)
Can Plato’s argument against democracy be answered? Joint 3rd Prize Benjamin Roth (UK)
Is there any satisfactory alternative to epistemological scepticism? Hilary 2021
1st Prize Alexandra Turner (UK)
What is the reductionist position as regards the epistemology of
testimonial belief? Is such a view defensible, do you think? 2nd Prize Stéphanie Lefortier (Netherlands)
Does theory change in the history of science undermine scientific
realism? 3rd Prize Adam Davies (UK)
Can reality be known as it is?
What is the role of the senses in the quest for 'real' knowledge? Highly Commended, Tom Mosher (UK)
In Defence of Nonsense: Fideism in Tertullian, Kierkegaard, and
Wittgenstein. Highly Commended, Paul Dixon (UK)
How might free will be compatible with determinism?
Michaelmas 2020
1st Prize Graham Cansdale (Belgium)
Does Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes offer the
best of Popper's and Kuhn's philosophies of science without their
weaknesses, or does it combine the weaknesses of both?< Joint 2nd Prize Emily Pollinger (UK)
Do you think that we should use the eggs of aborted foetuses to help
infertile couples to have babies? Why, and what would you say to those
who disagree?
Joint 2nd Prize Paul Dixon (UK)
Critically assess constructive empiricism.
Trinity 2020
Joint 1st prize Ksenia Vishninskaya (Russia)
Why did Hume think that we cannot have any experience of causation?
Joint 1st prize Jason Mahr (USA)
Is Entity Realism the right way to think about Scientific Realism?
Joint 3rd prize Bonnie Vanguardia (Australia)
Locke & The Social Contract: Issues with Justifying the State through
Voluntary Acts of Consent
Joint 3rd prize David Molyneux (UK)
How might free will be compatible with determinism?
Joint 3rd prize Łukasz Lech (France)
Would life in the state of nature, without government, be ‘a state of war’?
Hilary 2020
First prize Philip Painter (UK)
Would life in the state of
nature, without government, be a “state of war”? Second prize Michelle Hogan (UK)
Does all knowledge have an
epistemic foundation? If so, then explain what such foundations must be
like and evaluate how extensive our knowledge is in the light of this
requirement. If not, then explain why. Third prize Anja Segmüller (UK/Switzerland)
The Problem of Universals:
A case for Realism Michelmas 2019
First prize Ruth Cassidy (UK)
Strawson doubts that the
question whether determinism is true is a significant
one for morality. What are his reasons, and is he right? Joint 2nd prize Jonathan Hardy (South Korea)
Belief in the Head: The Externalist’s Journey Towards Understanding the
Mind and the World Joint 2nd prize Evgenia O’Connor (UK)
Does all knowledge have an epistemic foundation? If so, then explain what such
foundations must be like and evaluate how extensive our knowledge is in the
light of this requirement. If not, then explain why. Highly Commended Andrew Peasgood (UK)
Can a case be made for Eliminativism?
Trinity 2019
First prize Denise Hunt (UK)
Strawson doubts that the
question whether determinism is true is a significant one for morality.
What are his reasons, and is he right? Second prize Jeff Morris (Canada)
Justified true belief is
knowledge Third prize Jacqueline Bâby (France)
Viewing justice, fairness,
care, rights and equity in the modern world through the female lens Highly commended Gillian Chapman (UK)
Do you think there are
genuine moral dilemmas? Why? Highly commended Andrew Peasgood (UK)
Under what
circumstances, if any, is the state justified?
Hilary 2019
First prize Ben Clark (UK)
What are we referring to
when the object of thought is not an object that genuinely exists? What
is T. Crane's solution to the problem of non-existent objects? Second prize Simon Drew (UK)
To what extent
does Foucault’s work encourage us to rethink the social formation and
governance? Third prize Roger Salmons (UK)
Can a utilitarian
respect rights? Highly commended Bob Petersen (USA)
Moral dilemmas and the
growth of moral knowledge
Michaelmas 2018
First prize Tony Walton
Must good justification
be internal to the mind? Joint 2nd prize Romanos Koutedakis
Are meanings in
the head? Joint 2nd prize Michelle Hogan
Deontologists insist
on moral rules. Does this mean they can't be particularists? Highly commended Jennie Hiles
Why did Hume think
that we cannot have any experience of causation?
Trinity 2018
First prize: (none awarded)
Second prize Sandra Yorke-Mitchell
Deontologists insist on
moral rules. Does this mean they cannot be particularists? Third prize Jennie Hiles
E. J. Lemmon and
BeTTY’s place in moral theories
Hilary 2018
Joint First Prize Michelle Hogan
Is there any need to
explain why there is a universe at all? Would God be an
explanation? Joint First Prize Christopher Evans
Compare the way in
which Foucault and Derrida urge us to rethink social formation and
governance Joint First Prize Tony Walton
Some strengths and
weaknesses of Kripke's critique of descriptivism
Michaelmas 2017
Joint first prize Catherine Strong
Applying Moral Philosophy: a Case Study Joint first prize Andrew Peasgood
Did Berkeley
Misunderstand Locke? Third prize: Nicholas Juckes
The Problem of
Induction
Trinity 2017
First prize Jeff White
The Socratic method in Meno Second prize Andrew Peasgood
Do you think there are any genuine moral dilemmas? Why? Third prize Bob Stone
Monism and anomalousness: do they stand up?
Hilary 2017
First prize Sheila Radford
Why is the exclusion
argument a problem for anomalous monism? Second prize Jackie Walsh
Can a functionalist
account for qualia? Joint third prize Mary Ormrod
Set out logic-book
style the argument that follows, saying what type of argument it is,
and using the methods you were taught in the course, say whether or not
you think it is a good argument, where 'good' is appropriate to the type
of argument you have decided it to be. 'Every time I have played chess
with James he has been so irritating that I have been unable to
concentrate, and in losing to him I have lost a lot of money. Tonight I
am playing chess with Tom rather than James, but Susan tells me that Tom
is as irritating as James. I am probably, therefore, going to lose
concentration, and therefore money tonight.'
Joint third prize
Do I agree with
Strawson that adopting the introspective style of thinking that Descartes
adopts in his Meditations may lead one to deceive oneself about the
meaning of 'I'?
Michaelmas 2016
Joint second prize Marija Kirjanenko
Why
did Plato believe in Forms? Joint first prize David Heslop
Did God
create morality? Third prize Christopher Evans
Explain
and Assess Rawls' Theory of Justice
Trinity 2016
Joint first prize Chris Lyons
Can a utilitarian
respect rights? Joint first prize Tricia Baldwin
'Virtue ethics
lacks a decision-procedure to help us make moral decisions. –
It is not, therefore a good moral theory.' – Discuss Third prize Stephen Pickering
Can Stoic Bodies
be rescued from the Growing Argument?
Hilary 2016
First prize Aoife Hulme
Describe and explain
why Gettier-style cases demonstrate that the tripartite account of
knowledge is unsustainable. How should one go about offering a theory
of knowledge that is immune to Gettier-style cases, do you think? Can
one offer a theory of knowledge that is immune to Gettier-style
cases? Second prize Steve Bow
From competing
principles to competing pleasures: Out of the frying pan... Third prize Miles Fender
What is the
epistemic externalism/ internalism distinction? Which view is
preferable, do you think? Defend your answer.
Michaelmas 2015
First prize Ian Corfield
An Analysis of the Ontological Argument of St Anselm
Second prize Miles Fender
Why is the causal exclusion argument a problem for anomalous monism?
Third prize Chris Bailey
Can a utilitarian respect rights?
Trinity 2015
Joint first prize Andrew Webb
What is the reductionist position as regards the epistemology of
testimonial belief? Is such a view defensible, do you think?
Joint first prize Andrew Langridge
What does the underdetermination argument show?
Third prize (none awarded)
Hilary 2015
Joint first prize Chris Lyons
How might free will be compatible with determinism?
Joint first prize Sinem Hürmeydan
Why did Plato believe in Forms?
Joint third prize Dominic la Hausse
Describe and explain why Gettier-style cases demonstrate that the
tripartite account of knowledge is unsustainable. How should one go
about offering a theory of knowledge that is immune to Gettier-style
cases, do you think? Can one offer a theory of knowledge that is
immune to Gettier-style cases?
Joint third prize Pamela Heydon
Explain Sartre's distinction between being in-itself and being
for-itself. Discuss how this relates to the human mind as nothingness,
and to human freedom and responsibility.
Michaelmas 2014
First prize Pamela Thomas
Excuses for
murder Second prize Stephen Berry
Why is the causal
exclusion argument a problem for anomalous monism? Joint third prize Chris Lyons
What is Mill's
Liberty Principle? Does it correctly set out the grounds on which
government interference with individual lives is justified? Joint third prize Obeka Brown
'Virtue Ethics
lacks a decision procedure to help make moral decisions.
It is not, therefore, a good moral theory.' Discuss.
Trinity 2014
First prize: (none awarded)
Second prize: (none awarded)
Joint third prize: David Burrige
Reasonable
belief Joint third prize: Chris Lyons
What is the
problem of induction? Is it important to be able to offer an answer to
this problem?
Hilary 2014
First prize: Bob Stone
Does Kant
succeed in preserving freedom of the will? Second prize: Chris Bailey
What is
alienated labour and what would unalienated labour be like? Third prize: Stephen Pickering
Mill's Liberty
Principle: correct grounds for government interference?
Michaelmas 2013
Joint first prize: Claudio Divittorio
On Locke's Labor
Mixing Argument Joint first prize: Heather Noble
Do you think we
should use the eggs of aborted foetuses to help infertile couples to
have babies? Why, and what would you say to those who disagree? Third prize: Allan Hicks
What is meant by the
'Free market'? Are there any good reasons for limiting the free
market
Trinity 2013
First prize: Chris Lyons
Can a
case be made for eliminativism? Second prize: Yusu Liu
'Virtue
ethics lacks a decision-procedure to help us make moral decisions. It
is not therefore a good moral theory.' Discuss.
Third prize: Carlos Pérez Anguiano
Is there any
satisfactory alternative to epistemological scepticism?
Hilary 2013
First prize: Richard Camilleri
Describe and
explain why Gettier-style cases demonstrate that the tripartite account
of knowledge is unsustainable. How should one go about offering a
theory of knowledge that is immune to Gettier-style cases, do you think?
Can one offer a theory of knowledge that is immune to Gettier-style
cases? Second prize: Chris Bailey
Critically evaluate
Hölderlin's claim that 'Being expresses the joining of Subject and
Object'. Third prize: Harry Massey
Can a Utilitarian
Respect Rights?
Michaelmas 2012
First prize: Richard Camilleri
Why did Hume think that we
cannot have any experience of causation? Second Prize: Aoife Hulme
Does Berkeley
misunderstand Locke? Third Prize: Pamela Hirsch
What is the best
way of conceiving God's relation to time?
Trinity 2012
First prize: Richard Camilleri
Strawson doubts that the
question whether determinism is true is a significant one for morality.
What are his reasons, and is he right? Second Prize: Simon Borrington
Strawson doubts that the
question whether determinism is true is a significant one for morality.
What are his reasons, and is he right? .Third Prize: Richard Erskine:
Faith is believing
something on insufficient evidence. Is there any truth in this
suggestion? .
Hilary 2012
First Prize: Harry Massey
Does Locke adequately
justify rights to private property? Second Prize: (none awarded)
Third Prize: (none awarded)
