

Individuality in the work of Plotinus

Prof. Elena Ene Drăghici-Vasilescu





There cannot be the same formative principle for different individuals, and one human being will not serve as a model for several human beings differing from each other only by reason of their matter but with a vast number of special differences of form (Plotinus, *Enneads*, V.7.1.18-21)

We might say that these *logoi* [i.e. the *logoi* of wholes, each one of which maps onto exactly one sensible individual in the world] represent the maximally specific formal descriptions of the bodies that an individual soul can take up on earth during one of these world-periods.

James Wilberding, "Intelligible Kinds and Natural Kinds in Plotinus", in *Études platoniciennes* 8 (2011), p. 66.

PS [For Plotinus 'wholes' constitute a bundle of qualities peculiar to the 'sensible particulars', who, for him, are non-essential in their structure because they lack essence and 'pure' being'; Plotinus, *Enneads*, II.6.1.50-58].

We ought to call what are said to be essential completions of substance qualities, seeing that those of them which come from the formative principles and substantive powers are activities; we should call qualities only what are outside all substance and do not appear in one place as qualities but in other things as not qualities; they contain that which is extra and comes after substance, for instance, virtues and vices, and ugliness and beauties, and states of health, and being of this and that shape; (Plotinus, *Enneads*, II 6.2.20-26)

A. Plato:

A. Plato:

The realm of the **One** (an incorporeal metaphysical principle)

Ideas (Forms, Essences) and the Human Soul

Particulars: peoples, objects

3. **Plotinus**:

The *Logos/the* Intellect– (an incorporeal metaphysical principle); also the 'un-descended' human Soul

The logoi, i.e. sensible particulars that include a part of the the human Soul

Individuals: peoples, objects

individual souls

Thank you for your attention!